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ABSTRACT:  
How should educators respond to the whole phenomenon of ‘digital learning’? This question has 
been in vogue for the past twenty years or more and there is a need for a regular renewal of this 
question as societies change. This article will draw on some post-structuralist writing, particularly 
Deleuze and Guattari, to try to understand better the divide between the optimistic account and the 
pessimistic account of the effect of ICT on teaching and learning. It argues in particular 1) that 
ICT in its current form signals a paradigm shift in education—but this thesis is difficult either to 
prove or disprove; 2) that Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome provides us with a theoretical tool for 
understanding the pedagogical nature of this shift; 3) that this change is wider than literacy itself 
and announces posthuman elements in the socio-cultural environment of learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Evidence suggests that more and more children in the western world have access to the 
internet and that this access is bringing about at least a literacy change if not wider changes. 
Somekh et al. found that 10–12-year-olds spent 3 times as much time on their computers as 
they do at school while by age 16, this proportion had risen to 4 times (Somekh and Mavers 
2003, p.413). Belgian figures note that 91.2% of primary school children surf the internet at 
home while there has been an increase in internet use of 342.2% from 2000 to 2011 (Valcke 
et al., 2011). A study of Korean schoolchildren from 2007 also indicates internet use by 
school-goers at 92.8% (Sook-Jung and Young-Gil, 2007). Other studies in Australia confirm 
this trend (see Zevenbergen and Logan, 2008) where the figure of one region in Australia was 
given as 87.31% while Ireland at 92% (see Ipsos Mori, 2008) together with studies on social 
networking of Spanish youth (Colas, Gonzales, and De Pablos, 2013) confirm this general 
view that at least in western Europe computers have become part of a new literacy affecting 
children as young as 5 or 6. 
 
1. A PARADIGM SHIFT? 
 
It is generally accepted that children are now ‘digital natives’ (Prensky, 2001) and that this 
digital character has become central to childrens’ learning today. The impact of this state of 
affairs on the authority of parents, teachers, authorities, institutions of learning, and 
disciplinary leaders, such as professors, has yet to become clear. The web has risen up like a 
massive root system with its entanglements and contortions, links and hyperlinks, facilitating 
a new form of intimacy between learners and their sources. In the mind of its optimistic 
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advocates, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) offer the hope of abolishing 
poverty, fear, fragility, emptiness and isolation at the touch of a button. Recent political 
upheavals across North Africa are testimony to this new-found optimism and the belief that 
world-wide communication and generalised global support can bring about democracy and 
freedom. This mood is infectious. They contribute to the belief in a common global world 
with common global values and a safe environment where hand-held devices operate like 
magic wands drawing people into a zone of security where everyone is apparently connected 
and ‘friendly’. So what if there are occasional problems with personal safety and identity 
theft on the internet (See Valcke et al., 2011)? These negative side-effects are inevitable but 
minor, so the optimists say. Fortunately, access to a vast quantity of information signals new 
possibilities and the emergence of a new kind of learning, so why should we worry about 
some minor safety issues?  
Optimists ̶ Blake and Standish strongly label them ‘conservative’ (Blake and Standish, 
2000, p.6)  ̶  suggest that these technologies merely offer a new set of learning tools. They say 
that technology can still provide a take-it-or-leave-it resource located at one step removed 
from and still capable of ‘representing’ the content of knowledge.  They claim that the 
rhetorical form of the media can be overcome by careful reflective deconstruction. Hence 
ICT are a welcome support for any teacher’s attempt to put a shape on knowledge for 
learners. They offer marvellous, high impact resources that were never there before. They 
stand a good chance of improving creativity and concentration and they link the child’s web-
based activities at school with what they do at home. Accordingly optimists prefer to think 
that ‘there is nothing essential about a computer environment (or indeed any cultural tool) 
(Sutherland et al., 2000, p.198) and that with proper method these resources simply add to the 
productivity of users. They say that immersing children should be embraced positively even 
if ‘we remain uncertain about how we can systematically observe the new practices 
associated with computer use’ (Nixon, 2003, p.410) because ‘meaning-making’ and the 
constructive paradigm both still prevail in classrooms. Indeed on this reading the goal of 
current educational thinking on digital literacies should be to ‘establish a common language 
and some shared understanding about new media and online literacies and how these might 
be researched’ (Nixon, 2003, p.411). This is the happy picture. 
Meanwhile, while this environment is developing at full speed, educators still orient 
themselves to the more traditional human purpose of education by putting or attempting to 
put a shape on information for the benefit of learners. Educators continue to imagine 
themselves as mediators of knowledge, acting as the interface between the young people they 
teach and the vast quantity of information available. Mediators can be less optimistic about 
ICT because they are less certain that the character building process uppermost in an 
educator’s mind is possible in the context of multiple influences. They feel that they are 
waging a losing battle in view of the ‘obscenity’ of information available (Baudrillard, 
1983/1990) and the inability of students or indeed teachers to digest and reflect on the 
information available. 
Others propose that these changes represent ‘a more fundamental transformation in 
learning infrastructure’ (Livingstone, 2012, p.20). They are not so positive about what they 
see as a paradigmatic change. They say that a paradigmatic change on a par with the 
invention of the printing press is occurring. Papert, for instance, has called what is happening 
a ‘megachange’ (Papert, 1994), one that has brought in its wake a new orientation towards 
education itself. Indeed, once the sociocultural implications of learning are accepted, 
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‘concepts like knowledge, teaching, the disciplines and rationality’ have become destabilised’ 
(Somekh and Mavers, 2003, p.412). The work of Marshall Mc Luhan in the 1960s, especially 
his famous contention that ‘the medium is the message’ (Mc Luhan, 1987/1964), has now 
become quite relevant and can be taken to imply that the rhetorical impact of the new media 
has effectively re-defined the scope and nature of information itself. Lankshear et al. propose 
that ‘the digital age is throwing many of our educational practices and emphases and their 
underlying epistemological assumption, beliefs, concepts and substantive theories into doubt’ 
(2000, p. 39). They draw heavily on Lyotard’s critique in The Postmodern Condition, which I 
heavily interpret as follows:  
 WWW is increasingly using ‘established’ knowledge (hence conservative) 
 didactic energies of teachers are directed at managing media resources (hence diluting the 
mediating function of teachers) 
 the knowledge presented is evaluated in terms of its ‘use’ not its ‘truth’ 
 ‘Performativity’ is linked to (and often measured by) ICT competence (how well they 
manage with the medium) 
 Connectivity becomes the benchmark for high performance (how well connected are you?) 
[as interpreted, pp. 24−25] 
 
Any of these factors would give rise to pedagogical concerns and further debate but I am 
proposing to adopt a single line of direction, deriving principally from Deleuze. It still 
remains to be seen just how radical this shift has been in recent years and whether it is indeed 
a positive or a negative thing. In the next section I wish to highlight two contrasting concepts 
that have become important to the analysis of this problem. 
 
2. TWO UNDERLYING CONCEPTS: THE TREE AND THE RHIZOME 
 
2.1 THE TREE 
It is perhaps best to return to a figure that is already quite familiar to most educators. 
Arborescent root systems present knowledge as a tree-like feature with roots stabilised in the 
ground, out of which grow a trunk and branches. It is a common enough metaphor to speak of 
a ‘root and branch’ study or a ‘root and branch’ clean-up and one hears of ideas ‘stemming 
from’ other ideas and various ‘branches’ of learning. From this metaphor comes the idea of 
basic, intermediate and advanced command of a discipline and a linear progression through 
knowledge. This arborescent knowledge has a starting point and the way it builds into a 
predictable, almost pre-formed  (a priori) shape means that it constructs of its own accord  
well-grounded fields of knowledge that are stable and bordered and can be policed ultimately 
by experts. Teaching in these circumstances is conceived of as a manifestation of disciplinary 
authority, which implies a natural hierarchy, however it is managed, where the expert gives 
and the non-expert receives, where the expert grades and the non-expert is graded, where the 
expert decides what is to be learned and the non-expert simply complies with this authority. 
Knowledge understood in this way is linear and stable and it is divided up into areas where 
roots can be established and on top of these roots, a steady trunk of content with the eventual 
promise of expertise. There is a steadiness about this kind of knowledge which can withstand 
the storms of change and continually retain its core structure despite shedding some of its 
peripheral elements. 
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This arborescent type of structure establishes the starting point of a field of knowledge and 
grades the material so that it becomes progressively more developed and complex. Eventually 
it creates expertise and establishes institutions of knowledge, one of which is a ‘discipline’ 
that both shapes the knowledge and the learner – this interior quality of true knowledge being 
a basic Socratic requirement of educational knowledge. But here this Socratic move comes up 
against Foucault’s complaint about power/ knowledge, namely, that knowledge is arranged 
into discrete packages as a result of power interests more so than on the basis of any inner 
coherency, thus implying that the agreement to follow disciplinary knowledge is also the 
agreement to become complicit in its priorities and hence ‘subject’ to it. With even more 
sinister consequences, other underlying ‘abstractions’ like Unity, Totality, Reason, Subject, 
Origin, Tradition run the danger of operating as oppressive ‘apparatuses’ drawing knowers 
into the ‘subject’ position demanded by knowledge organised under these rubrics. Of course 
Foucault will attempt to wage war against these apparatuses and the general subjectification 
they imply (Gordon, 1980, pp. 83−86). However the effect of Foucault’s criticism is to 
increase rather than decrease any social disenchantment with traditional learning.1 Nor can 
the constructivist paradigm which lays so much emphasis on ‘meaning making’ and 
‘narrativity’ escape Foucault’s basic critique. ‘Subjectivity’ carries with it the ambiguity of 
being complicit in a wider context. Perhaps a new type of structure might enable the freedom 
that is much sought after by educators? 
 
2.2 THE RHIZOME 
A rhizome, on the other hand, is another kind of root system and it promises freedom. It is a 
relatively new metaphor in the context of educational studies. It has been used in the 
philosophical literature from around the year 2000 but its origins lie in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s definition as a taproot which has ‘a multiple, lateral, and circular system boasting 
all the tactile associations that this connectivity brings’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 5). 
This botanical term, which refers to a tuber root system, has now come to serve as a metaphor 
both for the World Wide Web (WWW) and also for the way the human brain operates where 
trillions of synaptic contacts are thought to operate and as yet have not yet been mapped or 
even properly understood. One could see the relevance of ‘rhizome’ as a metaphor for the 
way the human brain makes connections within its synaptic pathways. It may represent how 
signals are diverted onto other pathways if a minor area of the brain is damaged to 
compensate for the original one. Most commentators agree that the information on the web is 
presented to the surfer in a non-linear manner (Holmes and Gastaldo, 2004) although 
Drummond objects to the term ‘chaotic’ to describe it (Drummond, 2005). Few however 
would object to calling this presentation of information ‘radical’ in the sense that it points to 
some root change in the context of information storage.  
 
If we compare the complexity of these rhizomatic systems with a tree which has a linear –
root, trunk, branch- shape, we can see that human knowledge has been organised in 
                                                          
1 ‘What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which 
would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some 
arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects. Genealogies are therefore not 
positivistic returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-
sciences’ (Michel Foucault, Power/ Knowledge, p. 83). 
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traditional education to follow the arborescent model. Cut the roots of a tree and it dies. Cut 
the roots of a rhizome, on the other hand, and it diverts, drawing its moisture from other 
channels moving in other directions. The channels now accidentally become more important 
because of the diversion. Similarly, cut the roots of a discipline or abandon its foundations 
and it dies, whereas cutting out a site on the WWW simply blocks out one site while re-
energizing other sites, other perspectives, often making them appear as momentarily more 
important. The topography of this information presents itself as infinite and total, a resource 
that never dies but rearranges itself instead around the missing element. The immortality of 
the system is shown in the way information presents itself as a non-disciplinary species 
without fixed shape or preferred identity or medium like a minestroni soup which because it 
moves in many directions at once can repair itself easily without signalling any weakness in 
underlying structure.  
The rhizome suggests a form of curriculum that is not centred or built up by local 
authorities but rather fragmented and perhaps initially confusing but which is hopefully more 
democratic, more open to all available information (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.139).  As 
the information is not arranged in the form of a rational argument or a consistent narrative or 
indeed as having a particular line of direction, does this mean liberation? Perhaps Deleuze 
and Guattari might say so: 
We’re tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They’ve made 
us suffer too much. All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to 
linguistics. Nothing is beautiful or loving or political aside from underground stems and 
aerial roots, adventitious growths and rhizomes (p. 14).  
Supporters of the rhizomatic metaphor note the similarity between it and the Enlightenment 
project, arguing, as Deleuze does, that the rhizome offers a new opportunity for freedom from 
oppression (see Morss, 2000). On the basis of pure logic, there is no way of predicting what 
item of information comes next in a web search and there are difficulties when surfers try to 
retrace their steps due to inevitable distractions and deflections along the way. This 
‘deterritorialisation’ might indicate that we are finally freed from our serfdom to power 
interests, yet Deleuze and Guattari prefer this outcome to the inherent limitations imposed by 
arborescent thinking.  
So on this reading the rhizome is a liberating force, challenging established hierarchies 
while enabling escape from conventions and vested interests. This in itself could have a 
positive educational effect as it prolongs the anonymity cherished by children, enabling them 
to experiment with their identities, to play at being adult, to take forward steps which are 
immediately reversible. Wilson, for instance, analysed the manga/dojinshi phenomenon in 
comic book art, which has in recent years spread from Japan to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea 
and the Chinese mainland and the United States and used this art form to encourage students 
to generate drawings to put on the web (Wilson, 2003). For them the medium was so 
attractive that they enthusiastically set about developing appropriate art skills. This art form 
involves the insertion of micro-stories into an overall unending comic book story where ‘the 
disappearance of one part is of no particular consequence because it will be replaced or 
supplemented by other parts’ (2003, p. 222). All individual inputs were eminently 
substitutable as players uploaded their own prints/ pictures to this virtual world in response to 
the broad guidelines suggested for the characters. Their contributions for a moment could 
have become central to the never-ending action but also eminently deletable. While students 
could achieve instant acclaim by having their images published as part of the totality amidst 
their peers, they did not have to bear any responsibility for carrying the story forward and 
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could withdraw at any moment without recrimination. They could also be jettisoned. They 
were in a sense both reader and writer at the same time, while also being expendable as 
either, having achieved a status of being that is both hyperreal and empty. Their story lines 
operated like rhizomes, which can tolerate being broken off from the totality because the 
story can immediately find a new ‘line of flight’ and another direction (Wilson 2003, p.23). 
In conclusion, engagement in online activity might be liberating because one can make a 
mistake without this mattering too much, provided one does not need the recognition for 
having tried to achieve something.  
Because it is less subject to the dominant shapes of traditional knowledge, web knowledge 
generates an expectation that this new state of affairs is capable of delivering ‘a non-
authoritative pedagogy and organization of knowledge’ (Gregoriou, p.242) and this is 
initially thought to be a good thing because it ‘frees’ learners to be constantly in touch with 
different information. Their perspectives are broadened by the fact that there is no particular 
expectation that the knowledge emerging at any given time will be disciplined, fixed or 
requiring ‘subjectification’. Moreover expertise in a traditional sense has been abandoned in 
favour of the knowledge that is high impact and singular. Where traditional knowledge seems 
boring by comparison and too neatly packaged, rhizomatic knowledge benefits from many 
accounts and interpretations. One has to wonder whether this journey is a liberation, however, 
and whether the lack of an authoritative voice is a liberation. This question is leading us to 
identify some of the pedagogical effects of the rhizomatic turn.   
 
3. PEDAGOGICAL EFFECTS 
Let us return once again to the definition of a rhizome as a taproot which is ‘a multiple, 
lateral, and circular system boasting all the tactile associations that this connectivity brings’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.5). The rhizome does not grow in a particular direction like a 
tree. Learners find it difficult to establish a set of coherent outcomes from a web search 
unless they plot these outcomes in advance. Since information acquisition by means of web 
searches does not follow a straight line, it is hard to imagine an end point or any point that 
might be considered an end point against which to be plot the circular figure of knowledge. 
Let us suggest some possible pedagogical consequences of this knowledge environment, 
confining our attention to epistemological aspects and leaving aside two equally important 
aspects, namely the social and the moral. 
 
3.1 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FEATURES 
The first epistemological feature is the claim of any piece of information to fit into a larger 
set. One feature of rhizomatic knowledge is that it has become bite-sized and thus not so 
easily fitted into a larger set. Because of the scale, volume and speed of the information that 
hits the average surfer on the internet, there is no ambition to digest all that is available and 
those who are inexperienced have less and less chance to build up experience based on what 
is encountered. A second feature is that knowledge to be noticed must have high impact or it 
is instantly dismissed and so impact becomes the operation of a singularity much like a light 
switch that turns on and off without any need to establish context or history. There is a trend 
against integrating the information received by means of a subjective strategy, for instance, 
by composing a story or submitting to an objective self-standing system like a discipline. 
There is a resistance to linking knowing to a totality or forming one’s experience within a 
discipline or code. The focus seems to be more readily applied to the part rather than the 
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whole. Livingstone reported a case arising from UK Children Go Online of a 10-year-old 
who had to navigate a ship around the coast of Scotland in a computer-generated game. The 
child needed to enter the direction and the distance to be covered. The child failed repeatedly 
crashed the programme, never read the instructions because she was too busy on task and, as 
a result, did not step out of the game to consult a compass as advised in the instructions. 
Instead she crashed out of the game repeatedly without learning what she had done wrong 
(Livingstone, 2009). Livingstone also notes another case mentioned in Willett (2005, as 
referenced in Livingstone, 2012, p.18) of a group of ten children (9−13) involved in a 
Saturday morning club who had difficulty in performing a task that demanded sequenced 
steps. One of these, Angie, aged 9, had this to say ‘They let you go on the internet but it has 
to be educational stuff you look up and all that. That’s boring but we don’t listen to that and 
we look up what we want when the teacher’s not looking’.  
 
These examples simply illustrate the point that web information is not received with the 
disciplinary shape that one might expect. Indeed surfers have found a way to avoid the graft 
of learning by losing themselves in the bite-sized and high impact character of internet 
knowledge. One might conclude that learning is only allowed to impact on the surface of a 
learner’s life. The surfer’s attention is drawn here and there while the information is checked 
against its difficulty and difficulties are avoided. This means that units of knowledge are not 
allowed to shape a person’s character in the sense of Bildung but instead blend in with 
surfers’ actual states of mind and knowledge, moving them away from difficulty, 
incomprehension, challenge by offering switches to other available media – video rather than 
chart, article rather than video, presentation with higher number of hits versus one with lower 
number of hits etc. Information is closer to play than to work. In this context, the latest offer 
from a holiday company or a social club can easily distract surfers and bring them off focus. 
Gibbons has suggested that there has been a switch from a disciplinary system to one marked 
by a system of socially distributed knowledge while Le Grange also mentions how the 
learning achieved must be ‘applied, problem-centred, transdisciplinary, heterogeneous, 
hybrid, demand-driven, entrepreneurial, network-embedded and so on’ (Le Grange, 2011, 
p.750). It might be added that without disciplinary controls digital information relates 
primarily to other digital information rather than to integrated wholes and so the law of 
contradiction which is the normal guarantee of rationality itself, is not applied to a web 
search. Instead each piece of information is designed to stand alone and not as part of a 
system. Important information is characterized by the way it offers ‘instant feedback’ 
(Zevenbergen and Logan, 2008, p.38) and it is feedback that characterises the third 
epistemological feature of internet learning.  
 
In summary, the three key pedagogical features from an epistemological perspective can 
be listed as the bite-sized character of web-knowledge, the way it retains its relevance by 
means of its impact, and the character of the feedback loop it engenders and even demands. 
Those of us working in education recognize these are generalized features of the new learner 
who easily reorganizes knowledge in interesting but non-traditional ways, expects to be 
distracted as learning occurs and is conditioned to offer and require feedback, often on a ‘I 
like/ I don’t like basis. There are in addition some additional effects for teachers that follow 
from these features.  
 
 
3.2 OTHER EFFECTS 
The first of these effects for teaching is the fact that knowledge now needs to present itself as 
entertaining and pleasurable. The hard-graft is gone and the result is a decrease in the appetite 
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for sustained attention to any disciplinary task. While surfing on the screen, there are pop-ups 
and advertisements that happen to distract and to draw the inquirer in many directions at 
once, and so there is a sense of dissipation through converging emails, text messages and 
chat-rooms designed to beep or flash when visited. Surf-Knowledge distracts by its very 
nature and the search for it, as David Buckingham suggests has become ‘increasingly 
distinguished by a kind of pleasurable anarchy and sensuality’ (2007, p.81).  
 
A second effect for teaching is that knowledge presents itself as hyper-critical. Inquiry 
disowns any sedentary basis for its procedures. Indeed Deleuze and Guattari dismiss the 
sedentary point of view (2007, p.23) and promote instead ‘a nomadic subjectivity that allows 
thought to move across conventional categories that disturb ‘settled’ concepts, signs, and 
theories’ (as referenced Gough, 2004, p.282). One needs to ask about the effect of this 
cognitive nomadism on the young for it is one thing to promote a critical form of knowledge 
aimed at those who know the traditions already, those who have a sense of stability in their 
own personas and in their social surroundings; it is another thing to propose this same critical 
attitude to those (usually children) who do not as yet have a firm grasp of the conventions of 
their own societies. This is an issue that is as old as Socrates. Some argue that it is dangerous 
for children and young people unsure of themselves to engage exclusively in the instabilities 
signaled by rhizomatic inquiry. Others retort: what instability? There is no evidence that 
knowledge is stable, other than the power conventions that present it as such. Following this 
line of objection, those who think of internet knowledge as hypercritical imagine that no 
further critique is needed and so they effectively agree with the conservative mindset that 
wants to hold fluctuations solely on the surface. 
 
A third effect for teaching is that rhizomatic knowledge is difficult to remember. It 
presents almost an instant antidote to rote learning because rhizomatic knowledge is 
presented as a layered phenomenon, each layer valid on its own level because it is live on the 
internet and relevant because it happened to crop up as part of a search. Nevertheless sites 
and presentation media are not linked to one another in any logical fashion unlike grammar 
rules. The information is thus ‘briefly’ validated by the operator by means of a ‘click’ on the 
site which creates the key syntax of what is relevant knowledge and what is not. Because 
surfing involves hopping and switching, swiping, clicking (mouse), clunking (keyboard), 
mixing interpersonal issues with technical matters and cognitive, the result is that these 
vibrant but unpredictable links do not operate like a mnemonic might or a repetition principle 
in the Aristotelian form Repetitio est mater studiorum  (Repetition is the mother of learning).  
Social links are implicated but the line of direction, the logical links, the logic of the line of 
questioning, the research journey in itself is irrelevant to the results issuing from the research. 
The result is what counts not the line of direction that gets you there. So apart from the 
invisibility of machine logic, since machine-coding methods remain hidden (Standish, 2000, 
p.158), many individual searches do not involve any commitment to the line of inquiry 
undertaken but only to the result obtained. The learner somehow floats over or under the 
highlighted information. 
 
A fourth effect for teaching is the way web information downplays its historical character. 
All information must be relevant and available on currently maintained platforms. It is as if 
each bit of information needs to claim its position on a timeline that is uncompromisingly 
present in order to be valid. Cultures that have been undermined for other reasons and are 
‘hollowing out’, losing their own self-confidence and self-belief, are particularly vulnerable 
to this requirement to be contemporary. One can think of many areas of the world which have 
lost touch with their own survival traditions under the pressure of being contemporary. 
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A fifth effect for teaching is the fact that knowledge is sometimes contrived to be 
artificially limited. Sometimes as an antidote to the infinity of information on the web, 
knowledge is presented as easily accessible and this strategy is very attractive to teachers. 
This happens when knowledge is shaped on the web using a ‘games’ strategy with borders 
and levels which children and adults find attractive. The feeling of being able to move 
beyond levels is sometimes addictive. Various devices are used to give the impression of 
‘breaking through’ fixed borders as the learner progresses through a series of set tasks. In this 
way there is a tendency for distributors of rhizomatic knowledge to mimic the logic of 
internet games, enabling ‘drill and skill’ activities that induce repetitive behaviors and a fixed 
number of skills. The internet makes possible Robinson Crusoe-type building projects such as 
the ever popular Minecraft ™, which also play on the idea of finite/ infinite. There is no 
denying that repetition and looping are an attractive feature of these games and that as such 
they can reinforce skills (soft skills) but they have a paradoxical benefit because they also 
develop task-focused, compulsive behaviours that seem to inhibit actual socially cooperative 
learning patterns. A more creative possibility is some vivid exploration task using a 
programme like GoogleEarth or GPS software as these kinds of activities are open ended and 
may well mimic real exploration but these may ironically be too ‘live’ for teaching purposes.  
 
 
4  IDENTITY 
Just as significant are the effects on human identity. Under ‘rhizomatic’ conditions 
knowledge has become dystopian, meaning that rhizomatic knowledge does not claim to 
unify the psyche but simply invites the psyche to present itself through different avatars. In 
the past, it was thought ideal to have one identity, now it is considered better to have multiple 
identities. This is the schizophrenia of contemporary culture. In the past, undergoing a 
programme of study was thought to develop the learner in certain ways – the study of 
engineering would produce engineers or the study of history historians or the study of 
pedagogy teachers etc. while a general education would produce an educated person. And 
while this is still in relation to traditional programmes, there is a real problem for people 
trying to adapt to the different contact possibilities available on the WWW in this way. 
Pessimists might say that  where there is a trend to centre the curriculum on the internet itself 
or at least use the internet platform as the mediating device for programmes, a corresponding 
identity is formed that matches the internet – absolute, unhistorical and non-committal and 
this means a move away from traditional utopian visions of identity. Marshall has even 
suggested that dystopian knowledge has changed the way knowledge relates to the 
educational project moving education away from liberal humanist ideals (Marshall, 2008, 
p.12). There is no indication where it might be moving towards. Lankshear et al. note that 
where formerly knowledge was ‘until recently regarded as a universal welfare right under a 
social democratic model’, now in accordance with what I am calling its bite-sized profile, it 
has ‘been reconstituted in instrumental and commodified terms as a leading contributor and 
sub-sector of the economy’ (p.23).  
One can see the problem for human experience, which to follow Aristotle, is in itself 
united around the historical time-flow of ordinary experience (Metaphysics 1,1). In order to 
teach, humans need to be able to present learners with human knowledge, that is, biometric 
information that has been understood and shaped in a human way and integrated into a 
historical reality. Today we have moved away from Aristotelian thinking, meaning that 
attention has shifted away from the historical way human beings learn, building up notions 
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into hard and fast ideas, as Aristotle might say, and testing these ideas experimentally until 
they become central features of human experience. For information to be valid today, it must 
be renewed and justify itself as new. It is no use saying that in a rhizomatic environment we 
stand on the shoulders of our own ancestral selves, for these ancestral ghosts have no validity 
in a context of multiple identities. Nor is the internet solely about content but about opening 
up relations and keeping them open (Weston, 1994 as referenced in Lankshear et al. 2000, 
p.20). Hence the use of knowledge to unify the psyche is bound to be less effective and the 
call for a multiplicity of selves or psyches is beginning to drown out calls for a unity of 
psyche.  
 
Similarly the issue here is whether the rhizomatic turn is progressive also turns on these 
same educational effects. When John Dewey attempted to establish the progressive 
credentials of knowledge, his method focussed on experience and his philosophy followed 
the Aristotelian tradition of well-being. He considered three factors: subject knowledge, rules 
and regulations;  and school organisation (Dewey, 1988, p.28). He set each of these 
suggestions against the backdrop of  his democratic ideal since he argued first and foremost 
that ‘the progressive movement is … more in accord with the democratic ideal to which our 
people are committed than do the procedures of the traditional school’ (p.33). Dewey 
assumed that the democratic and the humane go hand in hand, the combination of which lead 
learners in the direction of a continuation of experience by which Dewey means a form of life 
that connects the past and the future, calling this a principle of ‘universal application’(p.35). 
In the same passage he experiments with the concept of growth, pointing to the need for 
direction so that growth promotes a consistently positive set of ends. The violin player 
practices in order to become better and more assured at playing the violin. All practical skills 
demonstrate the same features – they do the learner some good. What is learned is required to 
clarify and heighten the learner’s living experience and on the common social practices that 
are built into living experience (p.39). The metaphor is one of growth, continuity of 
experience, external social conditions impacting on growth, an ‘interaction’ between internal 
dispositions and external helps, a general ‘situation’ in which the continuity of experience 
expresses its interactive quality (p.44).  A good progressive educator then blends these 
conditions of learning in a sensitive manner while a traditional educator may make the 
mistake of relying almost exclusively on the external conditions he/ she or the school can 
provide. As a result the traditionalist comes to oblige learners to live off a ‘diet of pre-
digested materials’ (p.46).  
Although Dewey never could imagine the range and scale of the world-wide web, he 
would still note certain similarities between the ‘traditional’ approach and the situation 
confronting the rhizomatic learner. The absence of a teacher as the important mediator 
judging which information to present or facilitate at a time that suits the students amounts to a 
release from traditional limitations. The new environment of web inquiry is likely to be 
‘stimulating’ rather than ‘boring’ and the subject-matter encountered is likely to be 
effervescent. But will it be fulfilling in the old sense? In other words will people experience 
the satisfaction of learning? Rhizomatic inquiry could be seen as avoiding the flaws of 
traditional transmission because the digital activity is or seems to be free, anarchic, 
uncontrollable, indeed ‘nomadic’. However, if this surfing activity brings about no lasting 
effect and if all is being carefully watched, monitored and tagged to advertisements and 
various economic controls, then it is difficult to see this as a sign of liberation or 
progressivism. Nor is it easy to describe internet learning as a form of continuous experience 
because ‘experiences may be so disconnected from one another that, while each is agreeable 
or even exciting in itself, they are not linked cumulatively to one another’ (Dewey, 1988, 
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p.26). Similarly spending hours ‘being-in-touch’ (Long, 2013, p.80) does not usually mean 
being in a community of learners with other learners. It often means being isolated and linked 
to others who present themselves as already experts in some way or blog owners who prefer 
to present their interpretations as knowledge. The surfer then is induced into quiescence 
despite the stimulation. The induced passivity of minds and bodies might be another pointer 
towards inactive learning, quite contrary to the general impression of being busy and fully 
engaged. 
And as for school organization, rhizomatic inquiry could demand some changes to the 
structure of lessons and the way learning is achieved in schools. School timetables might 
have to include free time for research as students spend increasing proportions of their time 
working in groups researching material for projects. Orthodox centres of learning like schools 
and universities are not adapting to these demands as yet because most of them are defending 
the disciplinary (arborescent) structure of knowledge. But the scene is changing. 
All things considered, the rhizomatic turn signals a more fundamental change for 
educators than the simple addition of a new resource. While humans in the past have survived 
because they valued knowledge as an arborescent figure, this is because they valued human 
reason as the central organising element governing both knowledge and identity. Reflection 
on this depth structure extends back as far as the logos of Heraclitus and the many studies of 
the depth structures of human rationality, suggesting with these rational figures that people 
could be educated into some common human culture. It seems that the postmodern subject is 
no longer happy to dedicate itself to a quasi-Hegelian task of unifying and raising up matter 
to ever higher levels of rational expression. Instead it must make do and indeed act on the 
basis of remainders, deferments, deflections, confusions, half-baked ideas. A rhizomatic 
being must engage in a continuous readjustment to new data, which only the effective use of 
machines can hope to manage. Perhaps this is the reason why postmodern identities are so 
clearly linked to their machine connections. 
Calleja and Schwager (2004, p.5) may be right in holding that the term ‘human’ is 
becoming problematic. Hayles sees this problematic in the shift from a dialectic of 
presence/absence to a dialectic of randomness (as referenced, p.6) and this randomness has 
been given added shape by Ulmer who notes that there has been a switch ‘between alphabetic 
and electronic cognitive styles’ (as quoted, p.8). Since machines are masters of random links, 
and as humans increasingly depend on machines, then a different relation to time begins to 
govern human lives. A logic of happenstance ultimately develops and with it a new logic of 
change. The issue of hypertext almost exactly duplicates the physiological switching 
manoeuvres of young learners as they swipe and click between levels of information selected 
by means of association rather than by indexing (p.10). Perhaps Calleja and Schwager are 
right to be optimistic because ‘[h]umanity has survived the hostile environment it found itself 
in through the use and creation of tools and the development of technology that enables their 
creation.’ (p.12).  Perhaps optimists are right to point to the way the rhizomatic phenomenon 
facilitates a new form of intimacy that, in the mind of its advocates, suggests that it is capable 
of abolishing poverty, fear, fragility, emptiness and isolation at the touch of a button. I am 
rather less optimistic. In my view, educators need to find the ‘human’ again in the midst of 
this paradigmatic shift and this work has not really begun.  
Indeed we still don’t know whether the new environment is sufficiently dominant to replace 
traditional modes of knowledge acquisition helped by schools and teachers. Life in machine-time 
is characterised as much by random development as by forward planning. It suggests that having 
once invested our being in historical experience, we may now be investing in a particular kind of 
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forgetfulness of history. Indeed the speed of technological development is so great that we seem 
to have been thrust into a post-human environment with no time to wait. Rather than evolving 
eventually and after millennia into super-brains with super-bodies, we are impatient and want to 
bring this change about now in the immediate future. So the immediate trend is toward the bionic 
enhancement of the human body, the systematic invention and production of machine elements to 
replace non-optimal body parts, the preference for machines to replace human work tasks (often at 
the expense of human jobs), X-men and superheroes and a fascination with immortality and for 
the moment surface add-ons designed to enhance performance and improve health and pleasure. 
Can human knowledge survive at this speed or has the ‘human’ become the figure of an outmoded 
form of education?  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has limited its focus to three headings to illustrate the radical nature of current 
changes: the impact of the rhizome on the nature of knowledge, on the ‘human’ response to 
information normally handled by the term ‘pedagogy’ and on assumptions made about the 
humanistic foundations of education and finally on some effects of these issues on ‘human’ 
identity. As humans learn to become more mechanical and machine-like in their behaviours 
as a result of the rhizomatic turn, they enter into what Noel Gough has called a ‘posthuman’ 
phase (Gough, 2004) where the virtues of mechanical reliability, coping with randomness and 
ultimate impersonalism prevail over the traditional values of temperance and courage. A 
fuller discussion of this matter remains beyond the scope of this paper but the question adds a 
certain urgency to the current trials of the rhizomatic learner. For the present, our objective 
has been to comment upon some implications of this ‘new’ kind of knowledge for teaching 
and learning.  
 
NOTE 
1‘What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which 
would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some 
arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects. Genealogies are therefore not 
positivistic returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-
sciences’ (Michel Foucault, Power/ Knowledge, p.83). 
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